Indonesian Journal of International Law
Volume 17
Number 4 25th UNCLOS Anniversary

Article 1

7-31-2020

Law Enforcement over Fishery Activities in Contested EEZs
Kentaro Furuya
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, k-furuya@grips.ac.jp

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/ijil

Recommended Citation
Furuya, Kentaro (2020) "Law Enforcement over Fishery Activities in Contested EEZs," Indonesian Journal
of International Law: Vol. 17 : No. 4 , Article 1.
DOI: 10.17304/ijil.vol17.4.794
Available at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/ijil/vol17/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UI Scholars Hub. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indonesian Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UI Scholars Hub.

Indonesian Journal of International Law (2020), Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 439-454
https://doi.org/10.17304/ijil.vol17.4.794
Law Enforcement over Fishery Activities

LAW ENFORCEMENT OVER FISHERY ACTIVITIES IN
CONTESTED EEZS
Kentaro Furuya
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Japan
Correspondence: k-furuya@grips.ac.jp

Abstract
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was introduced with the adoption of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. In the vast waters extending from the baselines to 200 nautical
miles, the Convention allows coastal States to enjoy sovereign rights over―fishing resources but
has created delimitation issues with neighboring States. Law enforcement is vital to maintain
fishery order for sustainable utilization of resources in EEZs, even in the contested maritime
zones. Therefore, in this paper, the mechanism of law enforcement in the complicated contested
maritime zone is described, taking the Japan-China Fisheries Agreement as an example of a
possible practical solution.
Keywords : fishery agreement jurisdiction, Law enforcement, overlapping EEZs

Submitted : 5 February 2020 | Revised : 5 June 2020 | Accepted : 3 July 2020

I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (hereinafter,
“LOSC”) was adopted in 1982 and came into force in 1994. The Convention
was adopted after more than 30 years of discussions and negotiations by more
than 160 States. The Convention, inter alia, codified written and unwritten
law and integrated four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea.
Thus, the Law of the Sea Convention is regarded as the constitution at sea.
One of the most significant features of the Convention was the introduction of 200 nautical miles (NM) of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). The
EEZ is not a part of the territorial sea and neither does it fall under the sovereignty of the coastal State. On the other hand, coastal States have the right to
the natural resources of the waters, seabed, and subsoil and may utilize natural
resources, including fishery and oil and gas resources, in the vast waters of
their EEZs for further economic development. It is the sui generis zone and,
thus, significant for the coastal States.
The EEZs, however, brought the coastal States not only natural resources but issues of delimitation. Due to the presence of EEZ of the opposite or
neighboring States, States needed to delimit their EEZs to less than 200 NM.
The introduction of the EEZ reduced almost one-third of the traCopyright © 2020 – Kentaro Furuya, Published
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ditional high seas which was governed by the freedom of high sea.
Some semi-enclosed seas, such as the Baltic Sea and the East China Sea,
mostly became a part of the EEZ of coastal States.
Besides, the delimitation of the EEZs is politically sensitive. Delimitation of EEZ often means setting out the geographical scope of waters, in
which natural resources are available for the coastal States. Therefore, the
negotiation process is often challenging, particularly for those zones having
abundant resources. This can be explained using the perfect example of the
East China Sea. Traditionally, the East China Sea serves as fishing grounds as
it is rich in fishery resources. In addition, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) reported that the East China Sea
has the potential richest seabed with oil and hydrocarbon deposits in 1969.
Regarding the delimitation, the Japanese government considers median lines from the baselines for the appropriate and equitable delimitation of EEZ; this is reflected in the domestic law.
In comparison, the Chinese law simply stipulates the Chinese EEZ as 200
NM from its baselines and, in the case of overlapping with adjacent or opposite coasts, delimitation “shall be determined under the principle of equity and
based on the international law” without further detailed guidance. The distance between Japan and China in the East China Sea is less than 400 NM and
different justification was claimed; hence, this raised the delimitation issue.
If there is no agreed borderline of EEZ between two States, how can a
State maintain legal order in the overlapping zone through law enforcement
operations? The role of law enforcement activities is to put legal order in
reality through, inter alia, deterring violations of applicable laws and regulations by patrolling and showing its presence and suppressing and addressing
wrongdoers. Before the introduction of the EEZ, for example, fishery activities in the East China Sea used to be governed by the freedom of high seas
and controlled by the principle of the flag state jurisdiction. After the Law of
the Sea Convention came into effect, the legal order in EEZs is to be governed
by the coastal State in accordance with the legal regime of the EEZ. Without
any clear delimitation line of the EEZ, what legal regime should be applied,
and which coastal State may exercise jurisdiction over infringement in the
overlapping EEZ need to be elucidated.
This paper examines such issues that emerged with the adoption of
the LOSC and that are persistent in the overlapping EEZ. This paper reviews
the rights and duties of States in the EEZ, including law enforcement, and
duties of coastal States in overlapping maritime zones under the Convention.
Then, as a possible solution, the Japan-China fishery agreement is introduced
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to examine its role in maintaining the legal order of fishery activities at sea.
This Agreement has two functions, namely, (1) to provide a framework for
sustainable fishery activities and (2) to clarify law enforcement mechanisms.
Although it is essential to set out a sustainable standard for fishery activities,
this paper mainly highlights the mechanisms of the maritime law enforcement
aspect, which practically realize the standard.

II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE COASTAL STATE IN EEZ
UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
A. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OVER NATURAL RESOURCES
The LOSC introduced a new maritime zone, the EEZ, which is up to 200
NM from the baselines. In this zone, coastal States have so ereign rights for
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conser ing and managing natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed
and of the seabed and its subsoil. Besides, the coastal States have jurisdiction
over artificial islands, installations and structures, marine scientific research,
and protection and preservation of the marine environment.
As to the living resources in the EEZ, Article 61 obligates coastal State
to conserve in the EEZ. The Coastal State needs to take conservation and
management measures to avoid endangering living resources through overexploitation. Such measures include setting out the maximum sustainable
yield based upon the best scientific research available, and cooperate in the
region or global level, if appropriate. For stocks occurring within the EEZs
of two or more coastal States or both within the EEZ and in an area beyond
and adjacent to it, highly migratory species, marine mammals, anadromous
stocks, and catadromous species have their own rules for conservation and
management. In contrast, sedentary species follow the regime of the Continental Shelf in Part XI.
When the use of EEZ overlaps with other States, “due regard” obligation
comes into play. Article 56 provides “in exercising its rights and performing its
duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone the coastal State
shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States.” The high seas
rules, including freedom of navigation, also apply to the EEZ by virtue of Article 58(2). When a State, other than the coastal State, enjoys the rights applied
in the high sea, the State has due regard obligation to the rights and duties of the
coastal State and comply with laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State.
Typical examples of overlapping interests are the navigation of ships versus
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laying of fishing gears and naval maneuver exercises. Therefore, “due regard”
obligation is imposed on both coastal State and other States in the EEZ in
order to balance the interests of these States.
Exercise jurisdiction by the coastal State in its EEZ is set out in Article
73. This Article allows coastal States to take law enforcement measures with
regard to the sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage the
living resources in EEZs. The domestic laws and regulations relating to fishery activities of coastal States are applicable in its EEZ, and law enforcement
activities are “necessary to ensure compliance” with such laws and regulations as prescribed in the Article. In case of violation of these domestic laws,
a coastal State may take measures including boarding, inspection, arrest, and
judicial proceedings. If appropriate financial security or bond is posted, the
coastal State needs to apply the bond scheme, where detained boats shall be
released promptly. Besides, the penalty is restricted to monetary punishment
and does not include imprisonment or any corporal punishment. In cases of
arrest or detention, the coastal State notifies the flag State regarding measures
taken and penalties imposed.

B. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES IN THE DELIMITATION
OF EEZS
Article 74 stipulates “(t)he delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement.”
When no agreement can be reached, relevant States may proceed to measures provided in Part XV, “Settlement of Disputes,” or to “enter into a provisional agreement of practical nature.” During this transitional period, States concerned are
obliged not to jeopardize or hamper the process of reaching the final agreement,
which often referred to as the duty to “self-restraint.”
In this paper, a pertinent question is whether or not law enforcement activities in contested water jeopardize or hamper the process of reaching the final
agreement. Article 74 does not provide any guidance on what activities can be
considered as a breach of this duty. For example, if Japanese or Chinese authorities exercise jurisdiction over a foreign fishery boat in overlapping zones,
the question is whether or not it would be a breach of the duty to self-restraint.
International court cases have suggested the standard of this duty. In the
Suriname-Guyana Award, the Arbitral Tribunal saw that, in the first place,
the duty does not entirely preclude activities by States in the contested area.
On the other hand, the Tribunal found that unilateral actions that cause a
physical change to the marine environment would jeopardize or hamper
the process of reaching the final agreement on the delimitation of maritime
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boundary and are, thus, not permissible. This decision was consistent with
that of the Aegean Sea Case between Greece and Turkey. Greece requested
the International Court of Justice to direct, inter alia, refrain from all exploration activities or any scientific research on the disputed continental shelf.
Turkey carried out a seismic research activity by a ship, including using small
explosives to send sound waves to the seabed. The International Court of Justice denied the request since the research did not risk any physical damage to
seabed and subsoil and natural resources therein and was of temporary nature.
This stance was maintained in the Arbitral Tribunal.
Next, the Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire case addressed this duty, too. Ghana
and Cote d’Ivoire submitted their disputes on territorial sea and EEZ to the
Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea (ITLOS),
and Côte d’Ivoire requested provisional measures to suspend Ghana’s activity for natural resources. In the order of the provisional measures in 2015, the
Special Chamber of ITLOS pointed out that unilateral activities to gain information in the disputed area and the use of such information may cause irreversible risk to the other. Yet, it did not order to stop the existing activities but
only new activities. In the judgment of the case in 2017, the Special Chamber
of the Tribunal avoided stipulating the standard of violation and did not find
a breach of duty to self-restraint in Ghana’s unilateral activities. However,
Judge Paik, in his separate opinion, argued that activities causing a physical
change to the marine environment is an element for consideration. He contended it is a “result-oriented notion” and the necessity to consider whether
the actions in question would endanger the process of reaching a final agreement. In other words, it is the case-by-case basis to determine whether activities in question amount to jeopardizing or hampering the process of reaching
the final agreement.
Considering these points, law enforcement activities in the contested maritime zone would be a breach of duty of self-restraint. Such activities do not
cause a physical change to the marine environment, in general. Therefore, law
enforcement activities do not meet the standard of a physical change to the marine environment. On the other hand, law enforcement activities clearly express
that the contested area is under the jurisdiction of one State since law enforcement is based on State jurisdiction. This claim would be provocative to the other
party and make the negotiation process difficult. Thus, reaching the final agreement could be jeopardized or hampered through law enforcement activities.
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III. THE FUNCTION OF JAPAN-CHINA FISHERY AGREEMENT
Now, a pertinent question arises on how a coastal State can conduct law
enforcement operations to maintain legal and fishery order in contested waters.
A coastal State has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage
living resources in the EEZ and, to ensure compliance of laws and regulations,
the right to carry out law enforcement activities. Nevertheless, in overlapping
maritime zones, law enforcement activities are often challenging since those
activities could be a breach of international law and raise diplomatic tension.
As a result, the coastal State may hesitate to take law enforcement measures
against infringement. On the other hand, if no law enforcement activities are
carried out, there will be no power to maintain the legal order, which would
possibly lead to lawlessness. This paper analyzes the law enforcement mechanism of the Japan-China Fishery Agreement as an example of addressing this
legal complexity in overlapping maritime zones to maintain legal order in the
contested area of East China Sea.

A. 1955 AGREEMENT
The Agreement originated before the adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention. Around the end of the Korean Peninsula War in the 1950s, more than
160 Japanese fishery fleets and 1,900 fishers were detained by Chinese voluntary corps on the high seas off the Chinese coast without clear explanations.
Since the Japanese government had not recognized the then Chinese Communist government, the Japanese government could not take effective protest
measures without proper diplomatic relations. A Japanese non-government
organization, the Japan-China Fisheries Enterprise Association, initiated the
negotiation process with the Chinese side, the China Fisheries Council.
The first private Agreement was adopted in 1955 (hereinafter, “55 Agreement”) to ensure the safety of fishery operations and avoid detentions and
maintain freedom of high seas, including fishery. The 55 Agreement was applied to the high seas of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea and, inter alia,
designated six fishery zones for trawling to restrict fishery activities and promoted cooperation in case of accidents. Fishery councils, representing both
States, took responsibility to supervise fishers for compliance of the Agreement, and in case of breach of trawling operations, such incidents were to be
reported to the other party, which reported back the results of the investigation. This mechanism ensured enforcement jurisdiction by the flag state. The
Agreement was renewed, and a series of revised Agreements were adopted
in 1963 and 1965, respectively; however, the framework of the Agreement
was maintained until the 70s and influenced subsequent intergovernmen444
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tal Agreements. All these Agreements were provisional and private Agreements, but it secured the safety of fishery operations in the East China Sea.

B. 1975 AGREEMENT
The first formal intergovernmental agreement was concluded later in 1975
(hereinafter, “75 Agreement”) after the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China was
signed in 1972. This 75 Agreement basically inherited the existing fishing
order rather than providing a completely new fisheries regime. Nevertheless,
this Agreement was significant since both governments officially recognized
the existing fishery order, in particular, the following points.
Firstly, the 75 Agreement shelved territorial disputes in the Senkaku Islands and delimitation of the continental shelf between two countries. The
Chinese government had put forward its claim on Senkaku Islands after the
ECAFE suggested potential oil and gas reservoirs in the East China Sea in
1968. Therefore, the Agreement applied to the high seas of the Yellow Sea and
the East China Sea north of the Latitude 27 degrees North and excluded off
the Senkaku Islands and Japanese coastal areas. Article 1 of this Agreement
stipulates, “(n)o provision of this Agreement shall be deemed to prejudice
their respective positions on maritime jurisdiction.”
Second, protected areas from fisheries activities were taken over in this
Agreement. During the negotiation, the Chinese delegation claimed the succession of the unilaterally claimed security zones, namely the Military Warning Zone in the Bohai Sea, the Military Navigational Zone in the south of
Shanghai, and Military Operation Zones in the north of Taiwan. The Japanese
government did not recognize these zones mainly due to inconsistency with
international norms, including the freedom of high seas. Besides, the security
situations in the East China Sea and the Yellow sea had been substantially
improved in the mid-70s compared with that of the 50s, and the legitimacy of
such zones seemed illogical. On the other hand, early adoption of the Agreement was essential for the safety and reasonable exploitation of fish resources. Therefore, the Japanese government reserved its stance on these military
zones but decided pragmatically to deem these areas as protected areas for
fishery resources and prohibited fishery operations.
Third, regarding the enforcement mechanism, both sides agreed
with the principle of the flag state jurisdiction. Each party instructed
and supervised its fishery fleets to comply with the 75 Agreement faithfully and, in case of breach by domestic fishers, punished them. In case
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of breach by foreign fishers, each State reported the breach to the other party, which, in turn, reported back the results of the investigation.
Each State was not allowed to take enforcement measures such as stopping
and warning the breach witnessed on the scene. Thus, the law enforcement
mechanism was retained in the flag state jurisdiction strictly in this Agreement, too.

C. CHANGES IN THE MARITIME LEGAL REGIME
Around this time, there were changes in the international maritime order, which substantially influenced the Japanese maritime policy. The international community had gradually accepted the 200 NM maritime zones for the
exploitation of fishery resources. The Japan government initially opposed the
new maritime zone as it adversely affected the expanding Japanese fishery industry; however, it later changed its stance and accepted the new maritime zone.
In 1974, however, the Japanese delegation to the UN Conference of the Law
of the Sea in Caracas witnessed that Japan was one of the few States to commit 3 NM for territorial sea. The majority had moved and accepted 12 NM
for territorial seas and 200 NM for EEZs, which was reflected in the Informal
Single Negotiation Text. Reflecting this movement, the neighboring States,
including the US, Canada, and the USSR, introduced their fishery zones up
to 200 NM from the baselines. Observing the acceptance of the new maritime
zone by the international community and movement of neighboring States, the
Japanese government decided to change its stance.
Finally, the Japanese government adopted a new legislation to reflect the
new policy. The government adopted the Act on Temporary Measures Concerning Fishery Waters to counter the introduction of 200 NM zones by
neighboring States. This Act set out the Japanese 200 NM fishery zones except for the west part of the Sea of Japan (west of 135 degrees East), the East
China Sea, and a part of the Pacific Ocean (the Southwestern parts of the Okinawa Islands), considering that China and Korea had not set out such zones
yet. When the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 became effective for Japan
in 1996, the Japanese government adopted the Act on Exclusive Economic
Zone and Continental Shelf, which abolished the Act on Temporary Measures
Concerning Fishery Waters. This new Act set out the Japanese EEZ as 200
NM from the baseline; in case of overlapping of EEZ claims with neighboring
or opposite State, the delimitation of the EEZ should be based on equidistant
lines.
Soon after, the issue of delimitation of EEZs between Japan and China in
the East China Sea appeared. In 1998, the Chinese government adopted the
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Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and
the Continental Shelf, which provides the Chinese EEZ as 200 NM from the
baselines. The Law, however, does not suggest a practical solution in case of
overlapping claims with other States but simply provides that for claims that
overlap with adjacent or opposite coasts, delimitation “shall be determined
under the principle of equity and based on the international law” without further detailed guidance. Besides, the Chinese side claims its continental shelf
up to the Okinawa Trough by upholding the theory of natural prolongation and
claims further that other characteristics of the East China Sea, such as length
of the coastline, should be taken into account for equitable solution. This different approach towards the delimitation of EEZ created the overlapping area
in the East China Sea. Despite consultation between the two States, there is no
agreed delimitation line of the EEZ yet. Thus, a new agreement became necessary for exercising sovereign rights and the jurisdiction of two States and the
utilization of fishery resources.

D. 1997 AGREEMENT
The governments of Japan and China concluded this new Agreement in 1997
(hereinafter, “97 Agreement”). This Agreement is significant since it reconciles the legal regime of the LOSC, in particular, the EEZ regime, and the existing traditional fishery regime in the East China Sea by separating maritime
zones. In other words, the 97 Agreement, as a practical solution, allows both
States to utilize fish resources sustainably in the overlapping EEZs.
The 97 Agreement sets out the geographical scope of its application to the
entire EEZ of both States. As in the previous Agreement, this new Agreement
shelves the delimitation issue by providing that “nothing in this Agreement
shall be deemed to prejudice the position of either Contracting Party regarding
any question on the law of the sea” (Article 12). Besides, the fishery protected
zones that remained in the previous Agreement were abolished since these
areas are now in the Chinese EEZ, and fisheries activities are under the sovereign rights of China.
In order to overcome overlapping maritime claims in the East China Sea,
the 97 Agreement introduced unique maritime zones. First, this Agreement
designates the “Provisional Measures Zone” in the East China Sea, where the
EEZ claims overlap (Article 7(1)). Also, the Agreement excludes waters in the
south of the Latitude 27 degrees North (Article 7(2)), where Senkaku Islands
rests. Furthermore, the north of the Provisional Measures Zone is designated
as an intermediate zone, where the traditional fishing pattern is maintained.
This zone is located at the south tip of the EEZ claimed by Korea and was
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introduced by the exchange letter between the relevant Ministers. In order to
accelerate entry into force of this Agreement, both governments agreed to allow their fishery fleets to carry out fishery operations without a fishery license
issued by the other party. This zone is not prescribed in the Agreement, but, in
reality, the fishery regime is identical to the waters in the south of the Latitude
27 degrees North, which is excluded from the Agreement. In short, from the
perspective of the fishery regime, the Agreement designated waters where the
EEZ claim is overlapping, such as the Provisional Measures Zone. (Fig.1)
In the Provisional Measures Zone, the flag State jurisdiction, the traditional legal regime before the LOSC, is retained. In this zone, both States
observe the decision made by the Japan-China Fisheries Joint Committee
and take appropriate conservation measures and quantity control measures
so as not to endanger living resources by overexploitation while considering
the influences of the traditional fisheries. (Article 7(2)) In case of taking law
enforcement measures, each State exercise jurisdiction over its fishery fleets
only. Therefore, for example, the Japanese authorities exercise jurisdiction
over Japanese fishery fleets only in this zone. 1 When a Japanese patrol ship
witnesses a violation by a Chinese boat, the Japanese patrol ship may warn the
Chinese fishery boat on the scene but does not take any further action. Instead,
the Chinese authority will be notified and take measures against the fishery
boat. (Article 7(3)) This warning against breach by foreign fishery boats is one
improvement to ensure more strict compliance of the Agreement.
The same regime applies to the East China Sea of the south of the Latitude
27 degrees North and the intermediate zone of the north of the Provisional
Measures Zone. In the exchange letters between both governments, the Japanese (or Chinese) government will not apply its fishery laws and regulations
over Chinese (or Japanese) nationals in these zones provided the cooperation
between two States is maintained not for endangering living resources in this
zone by overexploitation. Thus, both States carry out law enforcement activities against domestic fishery boats only.
The EEZ regime of the LOSC is applied to waters not designated as the
Provisional Measures Zone, which is the “Reciprocal Measures Zone.” Each
State may exercise sovereign rights over fish resources in its EEZ, as stipulated in the LOSC. One State allows fishing operation by the other party and
may decide the kind of fish, quota, operating areas, and other conditions for
the other State annually, taking into account the conditions of resources and
capacity of its fishery fleets. 2 In setting concrete terms, the Japan-China FishOn the other hand, the agreement is not applicable within territorial seas. Therefore, any violation by a
Chinese fishing boat in the Japanese territorial sea is subject to law enforcement by the Japanese authorities.
2
Article 3 of the 1997 Agreement
1
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eries Joint Committee is established to negotiate for recommendations, which
is subject to be endorsed by both parties. In case of violation of laws and
regulations, one State may take law enforcement measures subject to prompt
release upon sufficient bond in accordance with Article 73 of the LOSC. The
State needs to notify the other party regarding the measures taken and punishment imposed.

IV. IMPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE EAST CHINA SEA
One of the most pertinent functions of the fishery Agreements between Japan and China is to reconfirm and introduce fishery law enforcement mechanisms in the East China Sea. The 55 and 75 Agreements confirmed that only
the flag state could exercise jurisdiction over its boats on high seas or the
principle of the flag state jurisdiction. The confirmation of this provision was
essential to avoid detention of Japanese fishery fleets by the Chinese authority.
The explanation of these detentions was not clear nor consistent with international legal and fishery order at sea. Since the number of Japanese fishery
fleets detained by Chinese authority was significantly reduced after the adoption in 1955, 3 this Agreement was successful for this purpose.
Upon the adoption and entry into force of the LOSC and the introduction of the EEZ regime, the new legal regime brought separate issues in law
enforcement. First, the claims of EEZs of Japan and China overlap with each
other. Both governments have not yet found any solution of delimitation. The
coastal State has sovereign rights over natural resources, including fishery
resources, in its EEZ. Which State’s laws and regulations to apply and enforce
is unclear without the clear delimitation line. Second, law enforcement activities in the overlapping EEZ would be a breach of the LOSC, as argued before.
Law enforcement activities are essential to maintain the legal order and realize
the sustainable use of fishery resources. However, the States would hesitate
to take such action to avoid a violation of international law. Moreover, such
events would escalate the situation and raise diplomatic tensions, which will
result in further difficulties in the negotiation process in the future.
To address these issues, the 97 Agreement designated and introduced the
Reciprocal Measures Zone, where the EEZ regime applies, and other zones,
including the Provisional Measures Zone, where flag state jurisdiction applies.
This separation clarifies the laws and regulations applicable to fishery boats of
each State. Within the Reciprocal Measures Zone, Japan and China, as coastal
3

See Kataoka, “History of the Trawl Fisheries”, note 28 above, 5.
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States, may enjoy sovereign rights and exercise jurisdiction over both domestic and foreign boats. On the other hand, the flag State jurisdiction is retained
in the Provisional Measures Zone to avoid a breach of the LOSC provision
and diplomatic confrontation. Without these mechanisms, both States would
not have been able to carry out enforcement activities effectively, which could
lead to lawlessness in fishery activities as well as overexploitation.
Moreover, the law enforcement function of the Japan-China Fisheries
Joint Committee of 97 Agreement is working suitably. For example, Japan
witnessed a swarm of 212 Chinese coral poaching boats off the Ogasawara
Islands chain in the Pacific Ocean in 2015. 4 Due to the vastness of the ocean,
law enforcement operation was significantly challenging since huge resources
and efforts were required. Japan Coast Guard arrested ten boats for violation
of Japanese fishery law and fishery activities without a license. The Japanese
government quickly updated the penalty to ten folds and notified these cases
to the Chinese authorities. Chinese government inspected suspected boats and
investigated cases. As a result of the increased penalty imposed upon coral
poaching and efforts by Chinese authorities, the number of Chinese poaching
boats in the vicinity reduced significantly. 5 This fact demonstrated the effectiveness of the law enforcement function by the Committee.
On the other hand, there still challenges in the Provisional Measures Zone.
First, the efforts of two States to due diligence to their fishers remain an important issue. If a State is not eager to enforce laws and regulations over its
fishery fleets, the fishery order is volatile. The other party may warn violations
of the other but is not allowed to take enforcement measures. This structure
may further lead to unfairness in fishery activities and destroy the fishery order expected through the Agreement.6
Second, the 97 Agreement is effective only for Japan and China. For example, the Agreement does not bind Korean and Taiwanese fishery fleets. In
order to harmonize legal fishery regime in the northern part of the East China
Sea with Korea and accelerate the ratification process, the intermediate zone
was introduced. A separate, non-governmental fishery agreement was necessary between Japan and Taiwan to bring the harmonized fishery order in the
East China Sea. These separate agreements lead the fishery order and law enforcement operations complicated. As far as the fishery Agreement is bilateral,
the treatment of the third party remains in the future.
Japan Coast Guard, Annual Report 2015.
Japan Coast Guard, Annual Report 2016.
6
The Agreement on Fisheries between Japan and the Republic of Korea, 1998, was suspended in 2016
due to, inter alia, illegal fishery operations by Korean boats and occupation of fishery grounds under the
Agreement.
4
5
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V. CONCLUSION
One of the significances of the LOSC was the introduction of EEZs, which
was up to 200 NM from the baselines. Under the LOSC, natural resources
under the vast area of the EEZ are under sovereign rights of the coastal State.
On the other hand, the vastness of EEZs leads to an issue of delimitation.
The equitable solution is often challenging for States and overlapping EEZs
remain even today.
Under overlapping maritime zones, law enforcement operation is one of
the most challenging issues. Law enforcement is essential to realize the rulebased order and ensure compliance of laws and regulations to avoid overexploitation. Besides, achieving sustainable use of fish resources is not only an
obligation of coastal States under the LOSC but the interest of the international community. Without practical law enforcement function, adverse effect, such as overexploitation of fish resources, is possible. Nevertheless, law
enforcement operations in the overlapping zone are challenging due to legal
and diplomatic problems. Such operations would be a breach of an obligation
not to hamper or jeopardize the process of reaching the final agreement under
the LOSC. Besides, it would lead to a political and diplomatic concern, which
further makes the negotiation process difficult.
In order to address this problem, this study investigates and analyzes the
series of Japan-China fishery agreements as a possible solution. It was found
that, first, the 97 Agreement is of practical nature as the delimitation and territorial issues are shelved. Second, the Agreement separates maritime zones
for clarification of governance, the Reciprocal Measures Zone, and other
zones including the Provisional Measures Zone where the EEZ claims overlap. While Japan and China may exercise sovereign rights under the LOSC in
the Reciprocal Measures Zone, both States retain the traditional legal regime,
i.e., the exclusive flag state jurisdiction, in the Provisional Measures Zone.
From the perspective of law enforcement, the Japan-Chine fishery Agreement
is beneficial since it ensures, by establishing the law enforcement mechanism,
sustainable use of fish resources while maintaining legal order in fishery activities in the overlapping EEZs.
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